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Abstract 
 
Since Comanor and Scherer (1969), researchers have been using patents as a proxy for 
new product development.  In this paper, we reevaluate this relationship by using novel 
new data.  We demonstrate that the relationship between patenting and new FDA-
approved product introductions has diminished considerably since the 1950s, and in fact 
no longer holds.  Moreover, we also find that the relationship between R&D expenditures 
and new product introductions is considerably smaller than previously reported.  While 
measures of patenting remain important in predicting the arrival of product introductions, 
the most important predictor is the loss of exclusivity protection on a current product.  
Our evidence suggests that pharmaceutical firms are acting strategically with respect to 
new product introductions.  Finally, we find no relationship between firm size and new 
product introductions. 
 
JEL classification:   O30 
Keywords:  Patenting; Pharmaceutical industry; New product management; Research 
productivity 
________________________________________________________________________ 
We received helpful comments and suggestions from Wes Cohen, Steve Currall, Bart Hamilton, Zeynep 
Hansen, Daniel Levy, Frank Rothaermel, Jason Simon, Michael Stonebrook, Jerry Thursby, Marie 
Thursby, Andrew Young as well as seminar participants at the 6th Annual REER conference at Georgia 
Institute of Technology. 
 
*Corresponding author contact information: E-mail address: matt.higgins@mgt.gatech.edu  
 
 2 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
 The role that patenting plays in the firm value equation has long been a question 
of considerable interest in the literature (Schmookler, 1962; Comanor and Scherer, 1969; 
Pakes, 1985; Jaffe, 1986; Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Griliches, 1990; Shan, et al., 
1994; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hagedoorn and 
Cloodt, 2003; Hall, et al., 2003).  This role is particularly relevant in the pharmaceutical 
industry given the high likelihood that firms will patent inventions (Cohen et al., 2003).  
However, it remains a theoretical and empirical question:  How adequately do patent 
counts, or various other patent-derived measures, proxy for the innovative success of the 
firm?  In this paper we explore this question with fresh data, using for the first time we 
are aware the combination of actual new product introductions by pharmaceutical firms, 
their associated product sales data, and these firms’ patents, both those explicitly linked 
to the new products, and all other pharmaceutical research patents issued to these firms.  
 We make multiple contributions to the literature.  First, we demonstrate that the 
relationship between patenting (and citation-weighted patenting) and new Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved product introductions has diminished considerably since 
results offered in the seminal work by Comanor and Scherer (1969) and later efforts by 
Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003).  We also demonstrate that the relationship between 
research and development (R&D) expenditures and new FDA approved product 
introductions is considerably smaller than previously reported.  Based upon superior data, 
our results provide evidence that calls into question the efficacy of using patents, citation-
weighted patents and R&D expenditures as proxies for new product development.  
 Second, we demonstrate that while measures of patenting and citation-weighted 
patenting remain important in predicting the arrival and the number of product 
introductions, the most important predictor is the loss of exclusivity protection on a 
current product.  Our evidence suggests that pharmaceutical firms are acting strategically, 
targeting the three-year window around the loss of exclusivity to introduce new products.  
The apparent ability of pharmaceutical firms, in general, to smooth firm revenues by 
targeting introductions appears to us impressive given the long development periods they 
face. 
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 Third, some researchers have moved away from raw patent counts and instead 
focus on citation-weighted counts in order to determine “strength” or “importance” of a 
patent, or as a proxy for “value” (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hall, et al., 2003).  
Using a large sample of pharmaceutical-related patents for our firms, we are able to 
demonstrate that more highly-cited patents are more likely to be associated with an FDA-
approved product.  This finding is economically meaningful since these patents protect 
the revenue streams of approved products.  In 2001, for example, average FDA approved 
products had revenues of $243 million. 
 Fourth, we explore the implications of relying upon the original filing date of 
United States patents, instead of relying upon the artificial "application date" listed on the 
front page of the patent document.  Consistent with Graham (2004), we use the first in 
what may be a string of patent application continuations, as an indicator of the date on 
which the granted patent originally entered the patent system.  This correction is 
particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry, since a large share of granted 
patents in this sector have had at least one continuation in their application lineage.  In 
our analysis, we find significant differences in the amount of pre-grant application lag 
that this correction offers.  Moreover, we find that continuation counts are a positive and 
significant predictor of new product introductions, suggesting to us that this variable 
contains information about the strategic use of the patenting process by firms. 
 Fifth, unlike the extant empirical literature, we explicitly control for each 
pharmaceutical firm’s underlying research portfolio.  Across all specifications tested we 
find a positive and significant impact on new product introductions.  This finding 
confirms prior research that shows the importance for firms to maintain healthy research 
pipelines (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). 
 Finally, we find no relationship between firm size and new product introductions.  
Other work that uses patenting as a proxy for new product development has found a 
relationship between these two variables, either positive or negative (Rothaermel and 
Hess, 2007; Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Shan et al., 1994; Acs and Audretsch, 1989; and, 
Bound et al, 1984).  In contrast, our findings are consistent with prior work that uses 
actual new product introductions as a dependent variable and introduces firm size as an 
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independent variable, and finds a size effect not significantly different from zero (Jensen, 
1987). 
 The remainder of the paper follows this structure: Section 2 briefly discusses 
patenting, new product development and research productivity trends in the 
pharmaceutical industry; Section 3 discusses the data used in our analysis; Section 4 
presents and discusses our empirical finding; and Section 5 summarizes the analysis and 
discusses the implications of our results. 
 
2.0 Patenting, new product development, and research productivity trends in the 
pharmaceutical industry 
 
 2.1 Research productivity trends 
 
Our analysis demonstrates that research productivity in the pharmaceutical 
industry (as measured by the overall industry drug-exclusivity and patent horizon) 
declined in the late 1990s—precisely when pharmaceutical patenting was exploding 
(Hall, et al., 2001).  A substantial factor contributing to these declines was that current-
market drugs were losing exclusivity protection at a much higher rate than they were 
being replaced by new FDA-approved products with exclusivity protection.1  The term 
“exclusivity” refers to exclusive regulatory marketing rights granted by the FDA under  
21 C.F.R. 314.108, which prevent generic products from entering the market.   
The pharmaceutical industry had a combined total of approximately 1,100 years 
of aggregate exclusivity protection in 1998.  By 2001, the exclusivity horizon had fallen 
to just over eight hundred years and showed a rapid rate of decline.  Figure 1 plots the 
total aggregate count of exclusive years for unique products approved by the FDA in the 
focal year.  The aging of the overall industry product profile is a critical factor explaining 
the observed rapid decline.   
                                                 
1
   One explanation put forth by industry representatives for this decline is that the easy drugs have already 
been developed and that the drugs currently under development are much more sophisticated and target 
more difficult diseases.  A second explanation, described in the Wall Street Journal (2004), suggests that 
the heavy reliance on combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening did not produce the hits that 
were initially hoped for when this technology was adopted in the 1990s.   
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Figure 2 plots the numbers of drug candidates at various stages of clinical testing.  
Overall the number of candidates in some stage of testing has dramatically increased.  
Nevertheless, the number of products actually approved by the FDA has remained 
relatively constant.  This discrepancy suggests that a comparatively large number of drug 
candidates fail or are withdrawn during the testing process.  For example, the ratio of 
candidates that mature to an NDA filing compared to the number of candidates in Phase 
III testing declined from 29 percent to 17 percent through the 1990s.2  
Further compounding the problem for the industry, new products take an average 
of ten to fifteen years to develop from initial discovery to final FDA approval (DiMasi, 
2001).  From 1988 to 2001, the average time required for the FDA to approve a new drug 
was approximately 20 months (Federal Trade Commission, 2002).  Over the same time 
period, the real cost of developing a new drug product increased, from $231 million in 
1987 to $802 million in 2000 (DiMasi, 2001).  Domestic research and development 
expenditures have followed the same trend.  In 1990, R&D expenditures for U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies totaled $6.8 billion, growing by 2000 to over $21.3 billion 
(constant dollars).  However, as a percentage of sales, R&D expenditures have remained 
fairly stable at around 15 percent from 1990 to 2001 (See Figure 3). 
 
 2.2 Patenting and new product development 
 
 Explorations of the relationship between patenting and new product introduction 
in the context of pharmaceutical innovation has a long lineage in the literature.  Comanor 
and Scherer (1969) produced one of the first comprehensive empirical studies to analyze 
the link.  Primarily interested in exploring the relationship between patents and 
technological change, their paper investigates how drug firms' patent counts during 1952 
to 1957 correlate with an input measure, the number of research personnel, and with an 
output measure, new drug product introductions from 1955 to 1960.  Measuring the latter 
as the number of “new chemical entities” (weighted by their sales in the two years 
following introduction), the authors demonstrate that, when scale effects are controlled 
for, patents appear to be a predictor of new product introductions. 
                                                 
2
   Author’s calculations based on data from Pharmaprojects and NDA Pipeline. 
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 Their paper, along with Schmookler (1962), has been a fountainhead for much of 
the literature published on this topic thereafter.  Patent counts have become a generally 
accepted indicator of innovative performance in terms of new technologies, new 
processes and new products (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Aspden, 1983; Bresman et 
al, 1999; Cantwell and Hodson, 1991; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Griliches, 1998; 
Napolitano and Sirilli, 1990; Patel and Pavitt, 1995; Pavitt, 1988; Ahuja, 2000; 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994, Owen-Smith and 
Powell, 2004; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart, 2000).   The paper’s implications are reasonably 
straightforward, although the authors did voice one important caveat that is too often 
given short shrift by subsequent authors who use patents as proxies for “research output.”  
Discussing their results, Comanor and Scherer (1969) state: 
[o]ur empirical findings also suggest that patents may be a better index of 
research input than output. [] The number of patents applied for may represent 
the effort expended by the firm in inventing, rather than the magnitude of the 
inventions which result from this effort.  While this finding is highly tentative, 
it is supported by the likelihood that the significance of a patent in terms of 
input is less variable than its significance in terms of output (p. 398). 
 
As such, these authors admonish researchers to take care in interpreting their correlations 
too broadly. 
 Subsequent studies of the patent-performance relationship have attempted to 
reduce the variability found by Comanor and Scherer (1969), principally by using 
different, or adding additional, measures.  Cockburn and Griliches (1988), for instance, 
examined whether changes in market value (Tobin’s Q) are related to a firms’ 
development of knowledge capital over time (measured as depreciated stocks of R&D 
expenditures and patent grants), and whether information on the importance of patents as 
an appropriability mechanism (Levin, et al., 1987) adds meaningful information and 
improves predictive power.  While they find that patent measures on their own appear to 
capture some relevant aspects of intangible capital, they note that when R&D measures 
are included the patent estimate either disappears or is heavily attenuated.  As such, the 
authors declare that there is “interesting information in patent counts, but it is subject to 
much error.  Data on R&D expenditures, where available, are stronger measures of input 
to the process by which firms produce technical innovation than patents are of its 
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‘output.’” (p. 422).  Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2003) add patent citations, finding that 
the inclusion of this “importance” metric significantly improves a model in which 
patenting is related to firm value, finding that patenting alone is a less meaningful 
predictor. 
 Despite these findings, other studies continue to rely upon patent counts alone as a 
reasonably good predictor of firm research productivity.  Henderson and Cockburn 
(1994) posit that, in the pharmaceutical context, patents are a meaningful measure of drug 
discovery because of the critical role that patents play in securing competitive advantage, 
suggesting that in science-intensive industries patents are highly correlated with 
profitability and market value.  Ahuja (2002) also relies upon this relationship in his 
study of organizational networks in the chemical industry, employing a count of issued 
patents as a measure of innovation output in this science-intensive sector.  Bloom and 
Van Reenen (2002) present evidence from a panel of British firms that patent and patent 
citation measures are strong predictors of firm market value, and suggest that these patent 
measures are potentially powerful indicators of technological innovation. 
 Hagadoorn and Clodt (2003) examine the relationship between R&D 
expenditures, patent counts, and patent forward citations to new product announcements.  
They thus appear to update the Comanor and Scherer analysis, employing data not from 
the 1950s but from the 1990s, and across four sectors (aerospace, computers, drugs, and 
electronics).  The authors "present a set of clear-cut conclusions" about their four 
indicators of innovative performance: patent counts, patent forward citations, R&D 
expenditures, and new product announcements (culled from news stories).  Analyzing 
their data with correlation and factor analysis, the authors assert that "in high-tech sectors 
any of these [] indicators could be taken as a measure of innovative performance in the 
broad sense."  This statement explicitly includes the drug sector, about which they state 
that "the results of our statistical analysis certainly do not dictate that a single indicator 
approach is invalid for the pharmaceutical industry …."  Thus, Hagadoorn and Cloodt 
claim that their evidence supports the use by researchers of only patent citations, or only 
simple patent counts, as an adequate proxy for innovative performance in the 
pharmaceutical sector.  The authors suggest an improvement, stating that a composite 
 8 
measure would likely be a better indicator, however they maintain that any single 
indicator is a meaningful proxy for firm innovative performance. 
In sum, this body of work suggests to us that the academy’s understanding of the 
relationship between patenting and firm performance is unsettled.  Indeed early work by 
Comanor and Scherer (1969) and Cockburn and Griliches (1988) each included caveats 
concerning the usefulness of employing patent data as a proxy for innovative 
performance.  Accordingly, statements in the subsequent literature declaring that any 
single patent indicator is an adequately proxy deserve scholarly attention.  Below we 
examine that hypothesis, as well as to test the nuances of these relationships, using what 
we believe are the best data available—actual new product introductions by 
pharmaceutical firms, their associated product sales data, and these firms’ patents, both 
those explicitly linked to the new products, and all other pharmaceutical research patents 
issued to these firms.  We find that, in the drugs industry, the patent-new product 
relationship does not hold. 
 
3.0 Data and sample 
 
 Table 1 presents descriptions and definitions for the variables we employ in this 
analysis, while Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for these variables.  
We collected financial data from Compustat, stock market data from CRSP, 
pharmaceutical sales data from IMS Health, and research pipeline data from 
Pharmaprojects and NDA Pipeline.  All financial variables are presented in constant 2000 
dollars.  When the original source is in a foreign currency, we convert into U.S. dollars 
using the average of the 12 monthly foreign/U.S. exchange rates over the relevant year.   
 The average aggregate market capitalization (represented in Log market cap) of 
our sample firms is approximately $28.2 billion.  These firms spend per year, on average, 
approximately $1.3 billion on R&D (Log R&D) and generate approximately $4.35 billion 
in prescription drug revenues (Log sales). They maintain per year on average 28 products 
in some stage of clinical phase testing (Pipeline Count) and file an average of six patents 
per year (Patent filings).   
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3.1 Pharmaceutical firm sample selection 
 
 Our sample is limited to those pharmaceutical firms that have had at least one 
FDA-approved product during the time period 1985 to 2001.  Unique firms are identified 
from the FDA Orange Book.  Subsidiaries are identified using the LexisNexis Corporate 
Affiliations database.  Overall, we have identified 308 unique domestic and foreign firms 
with at least one FDA-approved product 1985-2001.   
 We limited our sample to firms having at least one approval so as to make the 
overall sample more homogenous and to concentrate our analysis on firms that have 
demonstrated commercial success.  Firm size tends to vary widely in the pharmaceutical 
industry, ranging from the smallest start-up to the largest multi-national firm, and thus 
parallels the large variability in patenting and commercial activity.  Our sample selection 
criteria map onto the questions we explore in this paper, which are for the most part 
appropriate for more established firms.  Furthermore, we are fairly confident that our 
selection captures a reasonably complete picture of the industry:  For example, in 2001 
our sample firms’ sales totaled 79 percent of the entire industry.3 
 
3.2 Research pipeline profiles 
 
 We believe that determining product-pipeline characteristics for our firms is a 
useful analytical innovation, and particularly meaningful given our research questions.  In 
an effort to determine which products are in development at our sample firms, we use 
data from Pharmaprojects and NDA Pipeline during 1990 to 2001.  These data contain 
information relating to the various stages of product development.  For purposes of this 
study we focus on the following phases: Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III.  In the FDA-
drug approval process, Phase I involves safety testing, Phase II is concerned with small-
scale human efficacy trials, and Phase III focuses on large-scale human efficacy trials  
(See Figure 2).  We also identify the broad therapeutic categories, through the Uniform 
Standard of Classification, in which each stream of research is focused.   
                                                 
3
   Author’s calculations based on sales data from IMS Health. 
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 We consider two measures of a firm’s research pipeline.  Our primary measure, 
Pipeline count, is a count variable, in a given year, of the number of projects that a 
sample firm has in either Phase I, Phase II or Phase III clinical testing.  The average firm 
in our sample has 28 products in some stage of clinical testing in any year. 
 As a robustness check to this measure we follow Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) 
and assign clinical probabilities to each of the phases of research.  These assigned clinical 
probabilities reflect the likelihood that a potential treatment has of receiving FDA 
approval.  We subsequently employ these values to construct a weighted value of each 
company’s pipeline products, which we refer to as the Pipeline score.   
 The overall industry Pipeline count shows a marked increase in the mid-1990s 
and reflects an underlying increase in the number of products in firms' research pipelines  
(See Figure 2).  The number of early-stage pipeline products dramatically increased in the 
late 1990s as did, to a lesser extent, the number of late-stage products.  FDA approvals 
throughout this time period, however, remained fairly flat.  Comparing this trend to those 
presented in Figure 1, the increase in pipeline products appears to have not produced 
sufficient numbers of new unique products to stem the decline in the industry-wide firm 
exclusivity horizon. 
 
3.3 Patent profiles 
 
 In this paper, we use patents issued in the U.S. by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  The patents assigned to pharmaceutical firms may be 
characterized into two different types.  First, firms are issued patents that are directly 
attached to an FDA-approved drug (as identified in the FDA Orange Book.)  Second, 
firms are assigned a stock of non-attached patents.  These stocks of non-attached patents 
contain patents that are related to pharmaceutical research and patents that are related to 
other types of activities (e.g., medical devices, consumer products, management software, 
etc.)  In order to obtain a more meaningful picture of firm-level "pharmaceutical" 
patenting, we employ a mechanism to select patents from among this stock, so as to 
isolate patents germane to our pharmaceutical R&D study.   
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 Following an approach used in Graham and Mowery (2003) for identifying 
software patents, we distinguish relevant pharmaceutical-related patents by reference to 
their international patent classification (IPC).  We identified the twenty-five largest 
pharmaceutical firms by market capitalization (year 2000) and matched these firms to 
twenty-nine USPTO unique firm codes based upon an analysis of major subsidiaries 
using the LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations database.  We are thus able to identify 
11,090 U.S. patents granted to these organizations between 1975 and 2002.  Analysis of 
the primary international patent classes into which these patents fall demonstrates that 
36.4 percent were classed in “A61K” and 26.4 percent are classed in “C07D.”  The next 
most frequent class includes only 5.3 percent of patents.  These two classes (A61K and 
C07D)4 thus account for a cumulative 62.8 percent of these firms' patents, and we use 
these classes as our filter to identify "pharmaceutical patents."  
 In order to test the robustness of this definition, we generate the population of 
1,951 products identified in the FDA Orange Book from 1982 to June 2006 (these 
include all reformulations) and isolate the relevant applicant and patent information.  For 
the associated 1,267 unique patents attached to NDAs through 2002, we found that 73.1 
percent and 7.0 percent of these patents are classed into A61K and C07D, respectively.  
Thus, over 83 percent of patents actually attached to NDAs are assigned to these classes.  
Moreover, there is substantial overlap when using USPTO (as opposed to IPC) 
classifications.  Using the 36 NBER patent database "technological subcategories" 
derived from 418 USPTO classifications (Hall et al., 2003), we find that 75.6 percent of 
our 11,090 sample patents fall into two aggregated categories (numbered 14 and 31).  
This share compares with the 93.7 percent of the 1,267 NDA-associated patents that fall 
into these same two categories.  Since these two technology subcategories (built on 
USPTO patent classifications) are closely associated with approved FDA products, we 
can be reasonably confident that the underlying research related to patents in classes 
A61K and C07D is pharmaceutical related. 
  We make use of these international patent classifications to build a sample of 
pharmaceutical research patents assigned to commercially active pharmaceutical firms.  
Employing our population of 1,951 products identified in the FDA Orange Book from 
                                                 
4
 We exclude subclass A61K 07 which primarily comprises cosmetics (Harhoff and Hall, 2003). 
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1982 to June 2006, we create a sample of all firms to which at least one FDA-approved 
product was assigned.  These firms match to 325 unique USPTO organization codes, and 
we find that these organizations were issued a total of 154,775 patents during 1975 to 
2001, and that 50,466 (32.6 percent) of these patents are assigned into the primary 
"pharmaceutical" classes A61K and C067.5  Excluding the patents associated with FDA-
approved products, we are left with 49,563 patents, 96.5 percent of which are assigned 
into the NBER technology subcategories 14 and 31 described above.  For each major 
commercial drug firm in our sample, therefore, we produce a patent profile that includes 
both (1) all firm patents attached directly to FDA-approved products (n=903) and (2) the 
firm's underlying non-attached pharmaceutical-related patents (n=49,563).   
 We make one more correction to the patent data.  It is common for researchers to 
use the "application date" disclosed on the front page of the U.S. patent document to 
represent the approximate date on which an invention was reduced to practice, or more 
conservatively entered into the formal patent system.  As described in Graham (2006), 
this assumption is mistaken because it fails to account for the string of "continuation" 
events in the application history of the patents.  This assumption is particularly 
problematic when working with pharmaceutical patent data because the continuation 
rates in these patents may be as high as 60 percent of all issued patents (Graham, 2006).  
The continuation is a procedure available in the U.S. patent law that permits an applicant 
to re-start the application process, at will.  There is no limit to the number of times that an 
application may be continued,6 and the "application date" specified on the face of the 
patent document is merely the last of what may be a string of continued applications 
(Graham and Mowery, 2004). 
 In our sample of pharmaceutical research patents, we correct for continuing 
applications, testing the implications of using the "application date" versus the "original 
filing date".  We define “original filing date” as the date associated with the first 
continuing application in the granted patent's application lineage.  We find significant 
differences.  By way of description, 46.2 percent of our sample of 50,466 
                                                 
5
 We used a year 2001 truncation because elements of our product level sales data are available only to that 
year.  Our 50,466 sample excludes A61K 07 "cosmetics" patents.   
6
 Although, since 1995, the applicant is limited to a total window of 20 years in which to both apply-for and 
enjoy protection upon a patent. 
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"pharmaceutical research" patents assigned to major commercial firms had at least one 
continuation in their patent application lineage.  We also empirically test the lag between 
the original filing date and grant date for this sample.  We find a mean lag between 
original application filing and patent grant of 35 months, while the median lag is 32 
months.  These measures compare with a mean of 24 months and a median of 22 months 
when one uses the "application date" on the face of the U.S. patent document.   
 Figure 4 shows the time trend in patenting for our sample firms within the defined 
technology classes.  The dotted line plots patent applications while the solid line accounts 
for new patent grants within our defined technology classes.  The trend in patent issues 
for our sample firms has gradually been increasing from approximately 1,700 in 1990 to 
nearly 2,500 patents issued per year in 2001.   
 Finally, we explore the propensity to patent.  Consistent with Hicks et al., (2001) 
we define ”propensity to patent” as the ratio of patents to R&D expenditures (constant 
dollars, in millions).  Our numerator in this measure equals the total number of (defined)  
pharmaceutical patents issued to our sample firms.  Using a similarly-constructed 
measure, Hicks et al., (2001) find a constant propensity to patent of 0.38 from 1991 to 
1998 in the chemical sector, which includes pharmaceuticals in their study.7  We plot our 
patent intensity measure in Figure 3.  For our sample firms, the measure declines from 
1987 to 2001 with a sharp decline in the post-1995 period.  For emphasis, Figure 3 
compares this decline in “propensity to patent” against the ratio of real R&D 
expenditures to real sales.  This latter ratio has remained reasonably constant at around 15 
percent throughout the same time period.  Accordingly, it appears that increases in R&D 
expenditures have kept pace with increases in sales.  At the same time, however, overall 
patenting within our defined technology classes has also increased (see Figure 4).  Taken 
together this suggests that the rate of R&D expenditures is increasing at a faster pace than 
is patenting, thereby depressing the overall “propensity to patent” measure in the later 
years depicted in Figure 3.  Our interpretation is consistent with the overall decline in 
                                                 
7
   The time frame was broken into two patent year samples.  The first period consisted of patent years 1991 
to 1994 with R&D expenditure years 1989 to 1992.  The second period consisted of patent years 1995 to 
1998 with R&D expenditure years 1993 to 1996.  It should be noted that the Hicks et al. sample was 
limited to firms that received 50 or more patents per year. 
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research productivity in the pharmaceutical industry described by Higgins and Rodriguez 
(2006). 
 
3.4 Patent lags 
 
 While we find that the mean lag between patent filing and grant is 35 months for 
our sample of 50,466 patents, we note that this lag is not the key measure for our 
purposes.  Because we seek to replicate Comanor and Scherer (1969), we are interested in 
the relationship between patenting and new FDA-approved product introductions.  
Consistent with that earlier study, we determine the lag between original filing and FDA 
approval for those patents associated with new products.   
 The lag between patent filing and FDA approval has diminished considerably 
from 1985 to 2001.  In 1985, the mean lag between patent filing and FDA approval was 
180.6 months (median is 167 months).  This lag declined to a mean of 117 months 
(median is 107 months) in 1990, declining yet further to a mean of 77.6 months in 1995 
(median is 71 months).  By 2001, the mean lag between patent filing and FDA approval 
fell to 35.3 months (median is 47 months).  Over the entire sample period, the mean lag is 
59.6 months while the median lag is 61 months.   
 Since we find an average lag from 1990 to 2001 of 71 months, an average lag 
from 1995 to 2001 of 60 months, and an overall sample mean lag from 1985 to 2001 of 
60 months, we use as our benchmark a lag of five years, or 60 months.  We employ this 
figure to examine the relationship between patent filings from 1985 to 1996 (and citation-
weighted filings) on new FDA product introductions from 1990 to 2001.  Because our lag 
is longer than the three-year lag originally reported and used by Comanor and Scherer 
(1969) in their analysis, and also longer than that used in several other studies (e.g., 
Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Ernst, 2001; Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1994; and Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994), we  discuss below results 
derived from using both a three- and five-year lag for robustness.    
 
3.5 Size of the firm 
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 Studies that have considered firm-size in the context of patenting and firm 
performance have come to inconsistent conclusions about the role that firm size plays.    
On one hand, Jensen (1987) employs actual new products as a dependent variable and 
reports that firm size has no effect when introduced as an independent variable.  On the 
other hand, studies that have proxied for new products have shown firm effects to be 
significant (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Shan et al., 1994; Acs 
and Audretsch, 1989; and, Bound et al, 1984). 
 We are able, like Comanor and Scherer (1969) and Jensen (1987), to use superior 
data in that we use actual new product introductions, and not proxies, as our dependent 
variable.  As a result, we introduce four different measures of firm size in order to ensure 
that we are adequately controlling for any possible size effects.  The four variables we 
use are: the natural log of firm market capitalization (Log market cap), number of 
employees (Employees), natural log of firm total assets (Log total assets) and natural log 
of pharmaceutical sales (Log sales).      
 
4.0 Empirical findings 
   
4.1 Patenting as a proxy for new product development  
 
 Since Comanor and Scherer (1969), researchers have been using patents as a 
proxy for new product development.  The relationship between patents and new products 
has been backed by empirical analysis reported in Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003).  Given 
the extreme importance that this hypothesized relationship plays as a foundation for the 
findings reported in subsequent research, we examine the methodology employed in each 
of these studies in greater detail.  
 Comanor and Scherer (1969) focus on the correlation between new chemical 
entities (NCEs) introduced in the pharmaceutical industry from 1955 to 1960.  They 
weight NCEs by the sum of sales in the first two years of introduction.  In order to 
determine the appropriate time periods for their patent variable, they empirically 
determine the lag between patent application and product introduction.  They find the 
median lag to be three years.  As a consequence, they examine the relationship between 
 16 
patent filings from 1952 to 1957 (i.e., lagged three years) and report a simple correlation 
of 0.713 between lagged patent applications and sales-weighted new product 
introductions.  Holding firm size constant, they report a partial correlation coefficient of 
0.373 between these two same variables.   
 Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) search out news articles for announcements of new 
products in the pharmaceutical industry and correlate these with patenting activity.  Their 
patent period covers 1992 to 1999 while their window for new product announcements 
ranges from 1997 to 2000.  Hagedoorn and Cloodt report a simple correlation of 0.589 
between lagged patent applications and new product announcements (from news stories) 
for the pharmaceutical industry.  They do not sales-weigh their new product measure, so 
a direct comparison with Comanor and Scherer (1969) is not appropriate. 
 We discuss these two works because they have important implications for the use 
of patenting as a proxy for new product development in the pharmaceutical industry.  Our 
analysis produces dramatically different results.  Simply stated, our results do not 
comport with the findings reported in the above works, thereby drawing into question the 
efficacy of using patents as a proxy for new product development – at least in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
  In order to determine the origins of the differences, we duplicate the 
methodology employed by Comanor and Scherer (1969) with our data.  Our empirically-
derived lag between patent application and new product introduction is five years.  As a 
robustness check and in order to compare directly with Comanor and Scherer, we also 
report results for a three-year lag.  We match products approved from the FDA Orange 
book from 1990 to 2001 and sales-weight these with sales data provided by IMS Health.  
We are thus able to produce a measure that duplicates Comanor and Scherer’s (1969) 
methodology.  Next, we correlate this sales-weighted NCE measure with patent filings 
from 1985 to 1996 (five year lag).  Summary statistics show a firm-year mean of 5.91 
filings, with a maximum of 9.0 in 1994.   
 Our analysis produces a simple correlation of 0.1911.  When we instead use a 
three-year lag (patent filings from 1987 to 1998) we find a simple correlation of 0.2350.  
Holding firm size constant, we find partial correlations of 0.1785 and 0.2215, 
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respectively.  As stated above, these results are dramatically smaller than those reported 
in Comanor and Scherer (1969).  
 Next, we duplicate to the extent possible the methodology employed by 
Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003).  We mimic their approach and limit patent applications 
and product introductions to the same time periods they employ, and find a simple 
correlation of 0.2775 between patent applications and new product introductions.  Over 
our larger sample time period, we find an overall simple correlation of 0.2314 between 
patent applications (three year lag) and new product introductions.  When we consider a 
five-year lag on patent applications, we find a slightly lower simple correlation of 0.2263.  
Regardless of the sample period or lag, our results are considerably lower than the 0.589 
simple correlation reported by Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003). 
 As discussed above in Section 2.0, Comanor and Scherer (1969) conclude their 
paper by suggesting that “…patents may be a better index of research input than output.”  
(p.398)  Our simple and partial correlation results lend support to this statement.  Given 
the relatively low correlations we find between patenting and new products in the 
pharmaceutical industry, we suggest that patents are not an effective proxy for new 
product introductions in this industry.   
 In an effort to explore this issue in more depth, we analyze the simple correlations 
between Lagged patent filings and New drug indicator yearly from 1985 to 2001.  
Results are reported in Table 3(i).  Correlations range from 0.0984 in 1986 to 0.3919 in 
1991.  All but three years are significant at the 1 percent level.8  The overall sample 
correlation is significant at the 1 percent level.  There appears to be no discernable pattern 
over this time period as regards changes or trends in the correlations.  We do note, 
however, that the first year in our sample, 1985, follows the start of the so-called "strong 
patent period" reported by others and said to be ushered in by the creation of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a unitary patent appeals court (Kortum and 
Lerner, 1999).  The year 1985 also follows the structural break (1983-84) in U.S. 
patenting identified by Hall (2004).  Whether a discernable pattern in the change of 
                                                 
8
 Of the remaining three years, our correlations for two of the years are significant at the 90% confidence 
interval.  One year is insignificant. 
 18 
correlations over time occurred between 1960 (the end of Commor and Scherer's panel) 
and 1985 is, however, beyond the scope of our paper. 
 As a robustness check, we consider two additional simple correlations which are 
reported in Table 3(ii) and Table 3(iii).  First, in Table 3(ii) we present the simple 
correlation between Citation weighted filings and New drug indicator where Citation 
weighted filings is defined as a combination of Lagged patent filings and Total citations 
III.  These correlations are marginally larger than those reported in Table 3(i), with an 
overall sample correlation of 0.2375 (significant at the 1 percent level).  In Table 3(iii), 
we present simple correlations between All lagged patent filings and New drug indicator.  
All lagged patent filings combines Lagged patent filings with all other (non-
pharmaceutical) patents for each firm.  Predictably, the correlations decrease 
considerably, showing a total simple correlation of 0.1395 (significant at the 1 percent 
level). 
   One possible explanation for these results is that there has been a fundamental 
paradigm shift with respect to overall patenting activity within the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Clearly, the amount of patenting in the industry has dramatically increased over 
time (see Figure 4).  This increase in patenting over time, when coupled with the 
relatively stagnant number of new FDA-approved products, may be putting substantial 
downward pressure on these correlations.  So, while we remain agnostic as to whether 
patenting may serve as an adequate measure of “invention activity,” our findings suggest 
that patenting is not an appropriate proxy for innovation, or firm innovative performance, 
as defined by new FDA-approved products marketed by the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
4.2 New FDA approved product introductions 
  
 Patent counts have become a increasingly-used indicator of innovative 
performance, especially in studies of new technologies, new processes and new products 
(e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Aspden, 1983; Bresman et al, 1999; Cantwell and 
Hodson, 1991; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Griliches, 1998; Napolitano and Sirilli, 1990; 
Patel and Pavitt, 1995; Pavitt, 1988; Ahuja, 2000; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1994, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart, 
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2000).  However, because our findings suggest that pharmaceutical patenting is no longer 
an adequate proxy for new products, we must ask:  What purpose does it serve?  We now 
move beyond simple correlations and begin to focus on more the nuanced relationship 
between patenting and new FDA-approved product introductions.   
 Table 4 presents probit estimates for our data regressing New drug indicator on a 
series of independent variables expected to affect the probability that a firm introduces a 
new FDA approved product.9  In following sections we explore whether certain variables 
are related to the number (count) of drugs introduced.  The dependent variable used in the 
regressions reported in Table 4 is an indicator variable yit, that assumes a value of one for 
a given firm i in a specific year t if that firm introduces an FDA-approved product in a 
given year, and is zero otherwise.  For independent variables we use five-year lagged 
counts of firm patent applications (Lagged patent filings), the number of patent forward 
citations (Total citations II), the number of patent continuations (Total continuations), an 
indicator of a firm losing exclusivity protection on an existing product in years ranging 
from (t-1) to (t+2) (Drug loss), a measure of each firm’s research pipeline (Pipeline 
count), the natural log of R&D expenses (Log R&D), the number of employees 
(Employees) and the natural log of firm market capitalization (Log market cap).  Firm 
and year dummies are included in all models.  As a robustness check, we include an 
alternate measure of each firm’s research pipeline (as Pipeline score) and alternate lags 
for Lagged patent filings.  See Table 1 for variable definitions and Table 2 for descriptive 
statistics and variable correlations.        
 Across all four models (Model 1 to Model 4), we find a positive and significant 
impact of Lagged patent filings on the probability that a FDA-approved product is 
introduced in a given year.  Marginal effects range from 0.27 percent to 0.37 percent and 
are all significant at the 1 percent level.  With mean lagged filings of 5.50 and a standard 
deviation of 14.19, this suggests that for a one standard deviation change in Lagged 
patent filings there is between a 3.83 percent and 5.25 percent increase in the probability 
a new product is introduced.  
 The largest effects we report relate to the loss of exclusivity protection, 
represented as Drug loss and its various lags, both forward (Drug loss (t+1) and Drug 
                                                 
9
   Results remain robust when a logit model is considered. 
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loss (t+2)) and backward (Drug loss (t-1)).  We find a positive and significant impact of 
Drug loss on the probability a product is introduced in a given year.  In Model 3 and 
Model 4, we report the three other variants of Drug loss.  We focus on whether there is a 
drug loss in the year prior to introduction (Drug loss (t-1)), a drug loss in the year of 
introduction (Drug loss), a drug loss in the year following introduction (Drug loss (t+1)) 
and a drug loss in the two years following an introduction (Drug loss (t+2)).  
Provocatively, we find the largest effect associated with Drug loss, implying that firms 
are more likely to introduce new products in the same year that older products lose 
exclusivity protection.  One obvious interpretation of this result is that firms are simply 
attempting to smooth earnings by ensuring that threatened revenues are replaced by new 
ones.       
 In Model 3, marginal effects for Drug loss (t-1), Drug loss, and Drug loss (t+1) 
are 5.10 percent, 6.41 percent and 2.15 percent, respectively.  Marginal effects are similar 
in Model 4, showing 5.09 percent, 6.48 percent and 2.16 percent, respectively, for the 
same variables.  The marginal effects associated with Drug loss and its various lags are 
individually consistent with those associated with Lagged patent filings.  However, 
viewed cumulatively, the loss of exclusivity in the three-year window surrounding the 
introduction of a drug is significantly larger than Lagged patent filings.  The cumulative 
coefficients for the Drug loss variables range from 13.66 percent to 13.73 percent.  Our 
results suggest that the loss of exclusivity on a current drug is a far more important 
predictor of a new product introduction than is a firm’s lagged patent applications.      
 It should be no surprise that pharmaceutical firms attempt to manage product 
introductions so as to smooth revenues.  What is more surprising that firms appear to be 
successful in managing that process, especially given the long lags involved in new 
product development. The loss of exclusivity on an existing drug is an important and 
economically meaningful event to the firm.  As such, we take it that firms are aware of 
which revenue streams they have that are threatened, and have strong incentives to act 
strategically.  In an effort to illustrate this point, we combine sales data from IMS Health 
for FDA-approved drugs from 1990 to 2001.  Consistent with Higgins and Rodriguez 
(2006), we find that 74.19 percent of sales occur during this five-year exclusivity 
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protection period after FDA approval, while 15 percent of sales are realized in the three 
years following the loss of exclusivity.   
 Interested as we are in the role that these product introductions are playing, we 
add an empirical innovation and, in contrast to existing research, we explicitly control for 
the underlying research pipelines of the sample pharmaceutical firms.  We consider two 
different measures: Pipeline count and Pipeline score.  Both measures involve counts of 
the underlying number of research projects a firm has active in a given year.  Pipeline 
score is a more complex measure in that it attaches probability weightings to the various-
stage projects to generate an overall value in each time period (Higgins and Rodriguez, 
2006).  Even though it is more complex in its construction, unreported regressions show 
the effects remain similar to Pipeline count.  Overall, we find positive and significant 
effects across all four models on the probability of new product introduction, with 
marginal effects ranging from 0.06 percent to 0.12 percent.  With a mean value of 27.87 
and a standard deviation of 41.56, this suggest that for a one standard deviation change in 
Pipeline count there is between a 2.49 percent and 4.98 percent increase in the probability 
a new product is introduced.  Our pipeline findings are approximately the same in 
magnitude to those on Lagged patent filings. 
 In all four models, our variable Log R&D is positive and significant, with 
marginal effects ranging from 1.04 percent to 1.11 percent.  For a one standard deviation 
increase in R&D expenditures we can expect approximately a 2.0 percent increase in the 
probability a new drug is introduced.  The literature is replete with findings that relate 
R&D expenditures to patenting (e.g., Pakes, 1985; Jaffe, 1986; Cockburn and Griliches, 
1988; Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990; Ernst, 2001; 
Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003).  However, there are fewer studies focusing on the 
relationship between R&D spending and new product development, especially in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  An exception is Jensen (1987) in which a Poisson model was 
used to study the effects of R&D on new chemical entities (NCEs), producing a finding 
that increases in R&D expenditures increase the probability that a new drug is 
discovered.    
 Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) find a simple correlation of 0.817 between R&D 
and new products in the pharmaceutical industry (defined by SIC code).  For our sample, 
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the overall simple correlation between New drug indicator and Log R&D is 0.1046.  If 
we limit our sample to the same time period considered by Hagedoorn and Cloodt, then 
the correlation falls to 0.0626.  We have no explanation for this difference. 
 The interpretation between R&D and patent applications is much clearer than the 
relationship between R&D and new product introductions, especially in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  The average development time for a new pharmaceutical 
product is ten to fifteen years from initial discovery to final FDA approval (DiMasi, 
2001).  The development process requires significant R&D expenditures throughout the 
entire time period.  As a result, finding a positive and significant relationship between 
R&D expenditures and patenting may reflect some common unobserved factor in the 
firms’ overall underlying research programs.   
        Finally, we directly measure firm size by Log market cap and Log total assets and 
indirectly by Employees and Log sales.  Contrary to other work that has found some 
effect, either positive or negative, between firm size and innovative performance (e.g., 
Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Nohria and Gulati, 1996), we find no effect between firm 
size, either direct or indirect, and new product introductions.  Our finding is, however, 
consistent with Jensen (1987).  
 
4.3 Patenting and new product introductions 
 
 Table 5(a) presents negative binomial estimates for our data, regressing New 
drugs on a series of independent variables expected to affect the number of new FDA-
approved products a firm introduces in a given year.  Our results remain robust to both 
ordered logit and OLS specifications.  We apply a Hausman (1978) specification test, 
revealing that a random-effects estimation is appropriate. 
 Across all six models reported in the table (Model 1 to Model 6), we find a 
positive and significant relationship between patenting (Lagged patent filings) and the 
expected number of new product introductions (New drugs).  Coefficients range from 
0.0289 to 0.0513 with corresponding marginal effects ranging between 0.32 percent and 
0.94 percent.  (Marginal effects for all significant values in Table 5(a) are reported in 
Table 5(b).)  These marginal effects imply that for a one standard deviation change in 
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Lagged patent filings that there is between a 4.54 percent and 12.06 percent increase in 
the expected number of new product introductions. 
 Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) contend that simple patent counts may be a 
problematic indicator for innovation due to varying patenting intensities of firms.  In 
order to address this issue we replace Lagged patent filings with Patent intensity where 
Patent intensity is defined by Lagged patent filings divided by Log R&D.  In regressions 
replicating those presented in Table 4(a) we find coefficients ranging from 0.1613 to 
0.1730, with marginal effects ranging from 4.17 percent to 4.48 percent.  These marginal 
effects imply that for a one standard deviation change in Patent intensity that there is 
between a 1.72 percent and 1.85 percent increase in the expected number of new product 
introductions.  
 In Model 3 to Model 6 we report our findings for Drug loss and its various lags. 
In contrast to the results in Table 4 in which we find the coefficients peaking with Drug 
loss, these negative binomial specifications show that the coefficients are largest on Drug 
loss (t-1) and decline in magnitude to Drug loss (t+1).  The variable is not significant by 
year (t+2).  This result may be interpreted as suggesting that firms focus new product 
introductions on the three year period surrounding the loss of exclusivity protection of a 
current drug, with the largest emphasis on (t-1).  Coefficients range from 0.4524 to 
0.5348 for Drug loss (t-1); 0.3986 to 0.4442 for Drug loss; and, 0.2955 to 0.3831 for 
Drug loss (t+1).  Corresponding marginal effects range from 14.21 percent to 17.10 
percent for Drug loss (t-1); 12.11 percent to 13.48 percent for Drug loss; and, 8.39 
percent to 11.56 percent for Drug loss (t+1).  Once again, while there is a positive and 
significant relationship between patenting and new product introduction, the cumulative 
effects surrounding the loss of exclusivity are large (approaching 40 percent), and far 
outweigh the influence of patenting. 
 In contrast to the models employing probit estimations (Table 4), we find no 
effect between Log R&D and the number of expected new product introductions.  Across 
all specifications, both reported and unreported, the coefficients are not significant (tested 
to a 90 percent confidence interval).  For robustness, we replicate Jensen's (1987) use of a 
Poisson model, finding no significance on the coefficient for this variable.  As a further 
robustness check we perform Levine and Renelt’s (1992) implementation of Leamer’s 
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(1978, 1983, 1985, and 1988) extreme bound analysis (EBA) on Log R&D.  We find that 
Log R&D is not significant in any of the iterations.  Interpreting the divergent results 
produced in the probit and negative binomial regressions, our findings may suggest that 
the size of R&D expenditures has an effect on the probability that a new drug is 
introduced by a firm in any year, but not on the number of expected drug introductions.    
 Finally, consistent with our findings in Section 4.2, we find no effect between our 
measures of firm size (Log market cap or Employees) and new product introductions.  In 
unreported regressions, we produce similar results for Log total assets and Log sales.  In 
addition to controlling for firm size, we again control for the underlying research 
pipelines of the sample pharmaceutical firms.  Results are consistent with our previous 
findings.  We find positive and significant (1 percent level) effects between a firm’s 
research pipeline and new product introductions.  Overall results in this specification are 
consistent with our probit analysis.  In sum, these results bolster our findings that the 
largest marginal effects we demonstrate involve the loss of exclusivity protection on a 
current drug. 
 
4.4 Patent citations and new product introductions 
 
 Some researchers have moved away from raw patent counts and instead focus on 
citation-weighted counts in order to determine the “strength” or “importance” of a patent, 
or as a proxy for its “value” (e.g., Aspden, 1983; Narin and Olivastro, 1988b; 
Trajtenberg, 1990; Stuart, 2000; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 
2003; Fabrizio, 2004).  We address the issue of citation-weighted patents in two ways.  
First, we explore whether citation-weighted patents are a more meaningful proxy for new 
products than are simple patent counts.  Second, we address whether citation-weighted 
patents and the notion that they signal “strength” or “importance”.10 
 Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) report a correlation coefficient of 0.382 between 
patent citations and new products in the pharmaceutical industry.  This figure compares 
to the 0.589 correlation they find between patenting and new products, suggesting that, 
                                                 
10
   The relationship between patents, citation-weighted patents and market value is explored directly in 
Graham, Higgins and McKenzie (2006). 
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contrary to other empirical findings (Harhoff et al., 2003, Hall et al., 2003), citations 
contain less information about value than do simple patent counts.  Over the same time 
period considered by Hagedoorn and Cloodt, our analysis instead produces a correlation 
coefficient of 0.2379 between Citation weighted filings and New drug indicator, 
significant at the 1 percent level.  For our overall sample, which comprises a longer time 
period, we find a correlation coefficient 0.2593 between Citation weighted filings and 
New drug indicator, again significant at the 1 percent level.  While our results are again 
lower than those reported by Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003), they are consistent with the 
correlation coefficients we report in Table 3 between raw patenting and new products.  
Our citation measure therefore, unlike Hagedoorn and Cloodt, shows a higher correlation 
coefficient than do simple patent counts, thereby lending support to the findings in 
Harhoff et al. (2003) and Hall et al. (2003) that patent citations contain more information 
than simple patent counts.  
 As a robustness check, we generate the trend in correlations over our entire time 
period.  We present yearly correlation coefficients between Citation weighted filing and 
New drug indicator in column (ii) of Table 3.  Similar to the figures reported in column 
(i), no obvious pattern is discernable in the correlation coefficients over time.  Our 
correlations thus cast doubt on the appropriateness of using citation-weighted patent 
measures as a proxy for new products in the pharmaceutical industry.  While patent 
citations appear to have more information content than do simple patent counts, that 
added information does not reduce the variability sufficiently to adequately proxy for 
new product introductions in this sector. 
 If, as our correlations suggest, citation-weighted counts are not an adequate proxy 
for new products, we remain curious about what information citation-weighted counts 
provide, and what relationships other researchers may be observing.  To shed light on this 
question, we replicate the analysis from Section 4.3, replacing Lagged patent filings with 
Citation weighted filings in order to test whether citation-weighted counts affect the 
expected number of FDA approved product introductions.  Negative binomial estimates 
regressing New drugs on a series of independent variables that we expect to influence the 
number of expected new FDA-approved products are reported in Table 6(a).  Marginal 
effects are reported in Table 6(b). 
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 Consistent with our previous findings with respect to Lagged patent filings, we 
find a positive and significant relationship between Citation weighted filings and New 
drugs across all six models.  Coefficients range from 0.0039 to 0.0091 with marginal 
effects ranging from 0.05 percent to 0.14 percent.  All are significant at the 1 percent 
level.  These marginal effects imply that for a one standard deviation change in Citation 
weighted filings there is between a 1.06 percent and 2.97 percent increase in the expected 
number of new product introductions.     
 In Model 3 through Model 6 we report our findings for Drug loss and its various 
lags. Similar to the results we report in Table 5(a), the coefficients peak with Drug loss 
(t-1) and decline in magnitude to Drug loss (t+1).  The variable is not significantly 
different than zero by year (t+2).  These results again suggest to us that firms focus new 
product introductions in the three-year period surrounding the loss of exclusivity 
protection of a current drug, with the greatest emphasis at (t-1).  Coefficients in this 
specification are slightly greater in magnitude than those we report in Table 5(a), ranging 
from 0.5791 to 0.6663 for Drug loss (t-1); 0.5457 to 0.7019 for Drug loss; and, 0.3913 to 
0.4995 for Drug loss (t+1).  Corresponding marginal effects range from 17.10 percent to 
22.97 percent for Drug loss (t-1); 17.55 percent to 22.20 percent for Drug loss; and, 
11.73 percent to 14.89 percent for Drug loss (t+1).  Once again, the cumulative effect of 
the loss of exclusivity in the three-year window is large (approaching 50 percent) and far 
exceeds the impact associated with the other independent variables. 
 The extent to which firms are reaching across international borders to tap into 
research expertise may also improve research productivity, and lead to commercializable 
products (Thursby and Thursby, 2006).  To shed light upon the effect that firms' 
international research presence has upon new products, we introduce a variable Non-U.S. 
inventor constructed as a count variable, equaling the number of patent filings in any 
firm-year for which the first inventor listed on the U.S. patent is a foreign resident.  
Results reported in Tables 5(a) (Model 6) and Table 6(a) (Models 4 and 6) demonstrate 
that, whether using probit or negative binomial estimations, the coefficients associated 
with Non-U.S. inventor are positive and significant predictors of New drugs.  The 
marginal effects in Tables 5(b) and 6(b) imply that for a one standard deviation increase 
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in Non-U.S. inventor, there is between 2.50 percent and 4.18 percent increase in the 
expected number of new product introductions. 
 Finally, our control for the underlying research pipeline of our sample firms, 
Pipeline count, remains positive and significant, and the overall effects remain consistent 
with those reported in Table 5(a) and Table 5(b).  Once again, we find no significant 
effect associated with any of our firm size measures. 
 
4.5 Patent citations and value 
 
 Griliches (1990) and his progeny have suggested that patents attracting a greater 
number of forward citations are more valuable, or important, or have a higher quality 
than are more rarely-cited patents.  Because we can directly relate actual sales data to 
specific patents, we can test this hypothesis.  Again, we identify the exact patent(s) linked 
(by the FDA Orange Book) to FDA-approved products and collect the relevant sales data 
for these same products.  If we find that a firm's non-FDA-Orange-Book-linked patents 
are more highly-cited than patents linked to products in the Orange Book, the connotation 
from the existing literature would be that patents unattached to a product are more 
“important” or “valuable” than the product-attached patents.  The implication of such a 
result would be profound, at least within the context of the pharmaceutical industry, 
because it would turn practical experience on its head.  If the more highly-cited patents 
are legally challenged (say, in the courts) and protection is subsequently lost, the firm 
would lose the ability to enforce a patent.  However, if a patent associated with a FDA-
approved product were challenged and the protection lost, the revenues associated with 
that underlying patent would be put at substantial risk from competition. 
 We address this issue directly in Table 7.  We compile all pharmaceutical-related 
patents for our sample firms from 1985 to 2001 and generate three separate citation 
measures: Total citations I, Total citations II, and Total citations III.  We also generate a 
dummy variable, NDA, which equals 1 if a patent is associated with a FDA approved 
product.  Logit regression estimates for this data regressing NDA on these separate 
measures of citations are reported in Table 7(a).  Across all three models there is a 
positive and significant probability that a more highly-cited patent is associated with a 
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FDA-approved product.  Therefore, within the pharmaceutical industry, we add support 
to the notion that more highly cited patents are more “valuable.”   
 We are also interested in determining whether this "value" relationship has 
changed over time.  Table 7(b) reports average FDA-approved product sales from 1990 to 
2001.  Values are in constant 2000 dollars.  The average FDA-approved product had sales 
of only $42 million in 1990.  This figure had grown substantially, to over $243 million by 
2001.  The trend in sales has been increasing across the entire decade.  Combined with 
our discussion in the Section 4.4, our results suggest that even though citation-weighted 
patents do not serve as an adequate proxy for new FDA product introductions, we 
nevertheless find that approved products are more likely to be linked in the FDA Orange 
Book to more highly-cited patents.11  
 
4.6 Timing of new product introductions and patent continuations 
 
 
“Continuation” application practices permitted in the U.S. patent system allow 
firms to manage the timing of patent grants.  Because patent applicants may trigger a 
“continuation” application at will, even in the face of a positive grant decision by the 
patent examiner, the patentee is able to control the ultimate grant-date of the issued 
patent.12  Discussions with patent attorneys, and empirical evidence in Graham (2006), 
support the notion that pharmaceutical firms use continuation applications to map the 
grant-date of important patents to the approval of drugs in the FDA-endorsement process.  
Consequently, we expect that the use by the firms in our sample of “continuations” in 
their patenting practice will be positively related to new drug approvals. 
 We explore this relationship by creating a variable Total continuations which 
measures the total number of continuing patent application filings associated with firm i’s 
                                                 
11
     We express this finding with an important caveat, however:  We have not tested in this paper whether 
this highly-cited characteristic is endogenous to the inclusion of the patent in the FDA Orange Book--
indeed, it may be the case that the simple act of publication makes the future consumers of patent data more 
likely to become aware of the existence of the patent, and thus makes that patent's citing more likely ex 
post. 
12
 This practice promised greater reward for the pharmaceutical firms prior to 1995 when the patent term 
was 17 years from date of issue.  In the current regime, the patent term is 20 years from date of first 
application, and thus the firm suffers one day of lost patent term for each additional day of continuation 
application it chooses.  See Graham (2004). 
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patents issued in year t.13  Descriptive statistics of this variable show a firm-year mean of 
5.8 continuations with a maximum in 1992 of 10.8 continuations and an overall standard 
deviation of 15.13.  Reference to Tables 5(a) (Model 6) and Table 6(a) (Models 3-6) 
demonstrate that, whether using probit or negative binomial estimations, the coefficients 
associated with Total continuations are positive and significant predictors of New drugs.  
Consistent with our treatment of all patent data herein, our continuation measures enter 
these regressions lagged by five years, and our results remain robust to a three-year lag 
(unreported).  Accordingly, there is predictive power in a firm’s choice to use the 
continuation application process, possibly demonstrating the importance to these firms of 
employing patent-timing strategies.  The marginal effects in Tables 5(b) and 6(b) imply 
that a one standard deviation increase in Total continuations leads to between a 4.50 
percent to 6.05 percent increase in the expected number of new product introductions. 
       
5.0 Conclusion 
 
 Since Schmookler (1962) and Comanor and Scherer (1969), researchers have 
been using patents (and citation-weighted patents) as a proxy for new product 
development.  Within the context of the pharmaceutical industry, we demonstrate that 
this relationship no longer exists.  Our results therefore draw into question the efficacy of 
using these measures as proxies.  We also demonstrate that the relationship between 
R&D expenditures and new FDA-approved product introductions is considerably smaller 
than previously reported.  We do not call into question the reliability of the results 
reported in Comanor and Scherer’s work based on patents issued in the 1950s, but rather 
speculate that this change may be the result of a fundamental paradigm shift in 
pharmaceutical research, or in patenting  (Kortum and Lerner, 1998), or in the use of 
patent strategies, all of which have been reported but largely ignored in this context.  
 We make other contributions to the literature.  First, we demonstrate that while 
measures of patenting and citation-weighted patenting remain important in predicting 
both the introduction, and the number, of new products,  by far the most important 
predictor is the loss of exclusivity on a current product.  We consider the apparent ability 
                                                 
13
 Thus, a firm i with three issued patents in year t each with 3 associated continuation applications would 
have a Total continuations measure of 9. 
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of pharmaceutical firms to smooth firm revenues by targeting the timing of introductions 
as impressive given the long development period for drugs.  Second, using a large sample 
of pharmaceutical-related patents for our firms, we are able to demonstrate that more 
highly cited patents are more likely to be associated with an FDA-approved product.  
This finding is economically meaningful since these patents protect the revenue streams 
of approved products.  Third, we find that a correction for patent continuation 
applications leads to significant differences in the amount of pre-grant application lag, 
and also that continuation counts act as a significant and positive predictor of new 
product introduction, suggesting to us that the variable captures some information about 
firm patenting strategy.  Fourth, we find a positive and significant impact of a firm’s 
research pipeline on the probability and expected number of new product introductions.  
Finally, we find little relevance to firm effects. 
 We believe that considerable opportunities exist for further empirical research 
into these issues.  It would be of interest, for instance, to determine if the results we find 
above generalize across other high-tech industries.  Moreover, the data we use may be 
useful in exploring what effects alliance activity has upon FDA-approved product 
introductions.  Most important, however, will be more research into the fundamental 
issue we highlight in this paper:  If patents are not adequate to the task of representing 
innovative output of the firm, what measures are?  We leave these issues to other 
research, and researchers. 
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Fig. 1.  Total number of exclusivity years remaining for all unique patented products identified in the Food 
and Drug Administration Orange Book for the period 1990 to 2001.  Neither includes extensions to 
exclusivity stemming from litigation. 
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Fig. 2.  Total number of drug candidates in the various stages of clinical research identified in the new drug 
approved (NDA) pipeline for the sample firms over the time period 1990 to 2001.  Data comes from both 
Pharmaprojects and NDA Pipeline.    
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Fig. 3. The ratio of total firm pharmaceutical patenting to real R&D expenditures is plotted against the ratio 
of real R&D expenditures to real sales. 
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Fig. 4.  The dotted line accounts for all patent applications filed on behalf of sample firms within defined 
technology classes (with right side truncation).  The solid line accounts for new patents granted to our 
sample firms within defined technology classes.  The mean time lag between an application and its 
subsequent grant in our sample is 35 months, while the median lag is 32 months.   
 
Table 1: Definition and description of variables 
 
 
Variable     Description 
 
 
New drugs   Number of new FDA approved drugs introduced in a given year  
 
New drug indicator  = 1 if a firm has a new FDA drug introduction in a given year 
 
Patent filings   Total number of patents filed by a firm in a given year  
 
Lagged patent filings  Variable Patent filings lagged five years 
 
All lagged patent filings  Lagged patent filings plus all other firm patenting that was not included  
       in Patent filings (primarily non-pharmaceutical related) 
 
Non-US inventor   Number of patents that list a non-US individual as the first inventor  
 
Total citations   Total patent citations, including self cites, thru 2004 
 
Total citations II   Total patent citations, excluding self cites, thru 2004 
 
Total citations III   Three year window of total patent citations, excluding self cites 
 
Patent intensity   Lagged patent filings divided by Log R&D 
 
Total continuations  Total number of continuations by filing year for each firm 
 
Average claims   Average number of claims on issued patents 
 
Citation weighted filings   Three year window of citation weighted Lagged patent filings , 
excluding  
       self cites 
 
Drug loss   = 1 if approved product loses exclusivity protection in a given year 
 
Pipeline count   Total number of products in Phase I, Phase II and Phase clinical testing 
 
Pipeline score   Weighted value (non monetary) of Pipeline count 
 
NDA     = 1 if an underlying patent is linked with a FDA approved product 
 
Log R&D   Natural log of sum of R&D expenses lagged three to five years 
 
Employees   Number of firm employees 
 
Log total assets   Natural log of firm total assets 
 
Log sales   Natural log of firm level FDA approved pharmaceutical sales 
 
Log market cap   Natural log of firm market capitalization 
 
 
*  All financials are in 2000 constant dollars. 
 Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
   Mean   S.D.         1            2           3            4          5          6         7         8         9       10      11      12     13    14          15 
 
   
 
 
1.   New Drugs    0.26    1.17      1.0000 
2.   Patent filings     5.91  14.39      0.2533     1.0000 
3.   Non-US inventor    2.59    8.36      0.1470     0.3282    1.0000 
4.   Total citations I  31.39  91.15      0.0731     0.8201    0.1218    1.0000  
5.   Total citations II 24.41  65.04      0.0444     0.7900    0.1446    0.9803    1.0000 
6.   Total citations III   3.40    9.01      0.1526     0.8689    0.2166    0.8802    0.8762    1.0000 
7.   Total continuations   5.83  15.73      0.1582     0.9133    0.1545    0.8496    0.8334    0.8299    1.0000 
8.   Drug loss    0.10    0.67      0.3145     0.0063    0.0929    0.0079   -0.0054    0.0532   -0.0328    1.0000 
9.   Pipeline count  27.87  41.56     -0.0052     0.1562    0.0272    0.1713    0.1558    0.1396    0.1557     0.0117   1.0000 
10. Log R&D ($M)    7.20    2.01      0.1046     0.2450    0.0839   -0.3016   -0.2286   -0.2508   -0.2329    0.0439    0.0234    1.0000 
11. Employees (000s) 47.46  53.33     -0.0947   -0.1931    0.0591   -0.2132   -0.1463   -0.1752   -0.1771    0.0713    0.0270    0.4765    1.0000 
12. Log total assets ($M)   7.87    2.17     -0.0923   -0.2245    0.0810   -0.2580   -0.1888   -0.2163   -0.2139    0.0533    0.0155    0.9160    0.8880     1.0000 
13. Log sales ($M)    8.35    2.49      0.3584     0.3123    0.2553    0.2146    0.1863    0.2204     0.2445    0.0520    0.3737    0.0437    0.1224     0.0092    1.0000 
14. Log market cap ($M) 10.25    2.53      0.0545     0.0193    0.0263   -0.0280   -0.0255   -0.0183   -0.0113    0.0385    0.2567    0.1861    0.2001     0.1791    0.2316    1.0000           
15. Average claims    6.55    7.98      0.1541     0.4202    0.3245    0.3360     0.3431    0.3882    0.3589    0.0420   -0.0399   -0.1675  -0.1669    -0.1406    0.1877   -0.0260    1.0000 
 
 
 
*** All financial variables are in constant 2000 dollars.  Statistics are based on firm-year figures. 
 
 Table 3: Correlation between patent applications and new product introduction 
 
 
 
Column (i) presents simple correlations between Lagged patent filings and New drug indicator for the years 1985 to 2001.  Lagged 
patent filings is lagged five years per our empirically derived lag between patent application and new product introduction.  New drug 
indicator equals one if a new drug is introduced by firm i in year t.  Column (ii) presents simple correlations between Citation 
weighted patents and New drug indicator.  Citation weighted patents combines Lagged patent filings with Total citations III.  Column 
(iii) presents simple correlations between All lagged patent filings and New drug indicator.  All lagged patent filings combines Lagged 
patent filings with all other (non-pharmaceutical) patents for each firm.  See Table 1 for variable descriptions.  a denotes significance 
at the 1% level; b denotes significance at the 5% level; and c denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
Product introduction year  
Simple 
Correlation 
 
Simple 
Correlation 
 
Simple 
Correlation 
   
 
 
 
 
1985  0.3242a 
 
0.3317a 
 
0.0822 
1986  0.0984c 
 
0.0774 
 
0.2348a 
1987  0.1505a 
 
0.1434b 
 
0.0462 
1988  0.1412a 
 
0.1187b 
 
0.0003 
1989  0.3453a 
 
0.3438a 
 
0.2297a 
1990  0.2512a 
 
0.2553a 
 
0.2979a 
1991  0.3919a 
 
0.4227a 
 
0.2070a 
1992  0.2236a 
 
0.2143a 
 
0.0960 
1993  0.3582a 
 
0.3421a 
 
0.2245a 
1994  0.2419a 
 
0.2741a 
 
0.0412 
1995  0.2847a 
 
0.2881a 
 
0.2669c 
1996  0.2029a 
 
0.2037a 
 
0.1717b 
1997  0.2905a 
 
0.2874a 
 
0.1063 
1998  0.3126a 
 
0.3151a 
 
0.1979a 
1999  0.3219a 
 
0.2998a 
 
0.1022 
2000  0.0904 
 
0.1043c 
 
0.0664 
2001  0.3517a 
 
0.3480a 
 
0.1224b 
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Total sample (1985 to 2001)  0.2263a 
 
0.2379a 
 
0.1395a 
   
 
 
 
 
Total sample (1990 to 2001)  0.2664a 
 
0.2643a 
 
0.1459a 
 
 
Table 4: New FDA approved product introductions 
 
Probit estimates for our data regressing New drug indicator on a series of independent variables expected to 
impact a firm’s probability of introducing new FDA approved products.  The period for this analysis runs 
from 1985 to 2001.  The universe of firms for this analysis includes all firms that have at least one FDA 
approved product from 1985 to 2001.  Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution.  See Table 1 for 
independent variable definitions.  Firm and year effects are included in all models.  Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  We test the model: 
 
P(yi,t≠0|xi,t) = Φ(x1i,t + x2i,t + x3i,t + x4i,t + x5i,t + x6i,t + x7i,t + x8i,t + x9i,t + x10i,t + x11i,t + FE + c), 
 
∂Φ/∂xi = φ(xb)bi. 
 
 
a
 denotes significance at the 1% level; b denotes significance at the 5% level; and c denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
             Model 1          Model 2         Model 3          Model 4 
Independent variable  Model 1  ∂Φ/∂x Model 2  ∂Φ/∂x Model 3  ∂Φ/∂x Model 4  ∂Φ/∂x 
  
 
x1:  Lagged patent filings   0.0175  0.0037  0.0153  0.0032  0.0132  0.0027  0.0133  0.0028 
    (0.0024)a (0.0005)a (0.0026)a (0.0005)a (0.0027)a (0.0005)a (0.0027)a (0.0005)a 
 
x2:  Total citations II         -0.0002   
          (0.0009)  
 
x3:  Total continuations     0.0042  0.0008  0.0041  0.0008  0.0059  0.0012 
      (0.0021)b (0.0004)b (0.0022)c (0.0004)b (0.0020)a (0.0004)a 
 
x4:  Drug loss (t-1)        0.2188  0.0510  0.2185  0.0509 
          (0.1274)c (0.0326)c (0.1277)c (0.0327)c 
 
x5:  Drug loss        0.2703  0.0641  0.2728  0.0648 
        (0.1109)b (0.0293)b (0.1109)b (0.0293)b 
 
x6:  Drug loss (t+1)        0.0979  0.0215  0.0984  0.0216 
        (0.0325)a (0.0022)a (0.0319)a (0.0064)a 
  
x7:  Drug loss (t+2)        0.0480     
        (0.1244)    
 
x8:  Pipeline count    0.0055  0.0012  0.0054  0.0011  0.0051  0.0006  0.0051  0.0010 
    (0.0008)a (0.0001)a (0.0008)a (0.0042)a (0.0008)a (0.0001)a (0.0008)a (0.0042)a 
 
x9: Log R&D    0.0501  0.0106  0.0527  0.0111  0.0495  0.0104  0.0499  0.0105 
    (0.0200)b (0.0042)b (0.0200)a (0.0042)a (0.0203)b (0.0038)b (0.0203)b (0.0042)b 
 
x10: Employees      0.0008   0.0007      
      (0.0005)  (0.0005)   
 
x11: Log market cap   -0.0077  -0.0074   -0.0081  -0.0080 
    (0.0095)  (0.0095)  (0.0095)  (0.0095) 
 
Constant    -1.612  -1.6310  -1.6520  -1.6563 
    (0.1968)a  (0.1976)a  (0.1986)a  (0.1982)a 
 
Firm dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
N    3,196  3,196  3,196  3,196 
Pseudo R2    0.1252  0.1274  0.1331  0.1330 
χ2     192.50  200.73  218.39  218.14 
Table 5(a): Patenting and new FDA approved product introductions 
 
 
Negative binomial estimates for our data regressing New Drugs on a series of independent variables expected to impact the number of introductions of new 
FDA approved products by a firm.  We apply a Hausman specification test (1978), and its results reveal that a random-effects estimation is appropriate (results 
remain qualitatively robust to a fixed-effects estimation).  The universe of firms for this analysis includes all firms that have at least one FDA approved product 
from 1985 to 2001.  Firm and year effects are included in all models.  See Table 1 for independent variable definitions.  Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  We test the model: 
   
Pyi,t|i,t  e i,t exp i,ty i,t/yi,t!
 
 
where y is a non-negative count variable defined as the number of new products introduced by a firm in a given year.   P(yi,t|εi,t) is the probability that 
pharmaceutical firm i introduces y FDA approved products in year t. 
 
 
 
a
 denotes significance at the 1% level; b denotes significance at the 5% level; and c denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
       Model 1      Model 2       Model 3      Model 4       Model 5      Model 6  
 
 
 
Lagged patent filings   0.0513  (0.0045)a  0.0447  (0.0037)a  0.0337  (0.0044)a  0.0370  (0.0041)a  0.0308  (0.0049)a  0.0289  (0.0047)a 
 
Total citations II      0.0021  (0.0013)     
 
Total citations III          0.0126  (0.0098)   
 
Total continuations            0.0105  (0.0048)b   
 
Non-US Inventor            0.0141  (0.0083)c 
 
Average claims          0.0132 (0.0112) 
 
Drug loss (t-1)      0.4871  (0.1960)a  0.4524  (0.1966)b  0.5108  (0.1979)a  0.5348  (0.1990)a 
 
Drug loss       0.4278  (0.1755)b  0.3986  (0.1719)b   0.4219  (0.1740)c  0.4442  (0.1761)a 
 
Drug loss (t+1)      0.3603  (0.2025)c  0.3831  (0.2054)c  0.3421  (0.1979)c  0.2955  (0.1651)c 
 
Drug loss (t+2)      0.0073  (0.2323)       
 
Pipeline count    0.0053  (0.0011)a  0.0053  (0.0015)a  0.0054  (0.0015)a  0.0056  (0.0015)a  0.0052  (0.0016)a  
        
Log R&D        0.0528  (0.0431)   0.0530  (0.0429)  0.0526  (0.0433)  0.0495  (0.0438) 
 
  
 
Log market cap      0.0006  (0.0184)  0.0002 (0.0189)  0.0002  (0.0187)   0.0027  (0.0189) 
 
Employees      -0.0003  (0.0015) 
 
Constant  -3.8142  (0.1302)a -2.0567  (0.1421)a -2.2887  (0.4159)a -2.2852  (0.4134)a -2.2861  (0.4192)a -2.2534  (0.4183)a 
    
   
   
 
Firm dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes            Yes            Yes             Yes 
Year dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes            Yes            Yes             Yes  
 
N            8,311         4,004         3,196          3,196           3,196           3,196 
Log likelihood       -2529.25      -2214.85     -1501.37      -1502.45       -1500.15        -1498.71 
χ2          651.67       350.35        287.74         273.68         293.15          284.49 
    
 
Table 6(a): Citation-weighted patenting and new FDA approved product introductions 
 
 
Negative binomial estimates for our data regressing New Drugs on a series of independent variables expected to impact the number of new FDA approved 
drugs a firm generates.  Citations III is used to weight patent filings.  The results remain robust to the use of Citations II as an alternative.  We apply a 
Hausman specification test (1978), and its results reveal that a random-effects estimation is appropriate (results remain qualitatively robust to a fixed-effects 
estimation).  The universe of firms for this analysis includes all firms that have at least one FDA approved product from 1985 to 2001.  Firm and year effects 
are included in all models.  See Table 1 for independent variable definitions.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  We test the model: 
   
Pyi,t|i,t  e i,t exp i,ty i,t/yi,t!
 
 
where y is a non-negative count variable defined as the number of new FDA approved products a firm has in a given year.   P(yi,t|εi,t) is the probability that 
pharmaceutical firm i introduces y FDA approved products in year t. 
 
 
 
 
a
 denotes significance at the 1% level; b denotes significance at the 5% level; and c denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
       Model 1      Model 2       Model 3      Model 4       Model 5      Model 6  
 
 
 
Citation weighted    0.0091  (0.0007)a  0.0078  (0.0006)a  0.0040  (0.0008)a  0.0039  (0.0007)a  0.0042  (0.0006)a  0.0039  (0.0006)a 
   filings 
 
Total continuations      0.0148 (0.0052)a   0.0124  (0.0051)a  0.0147  (0.0047)a  0.0133  (0.0046)a   
 
Non-US Inventor        0.0199  (0.0078)b    0.0164  (0.0055)a 
 
Average claims          0.0112  (0.0093) 
 
Drug loss (t-1)      0.6600  (0.2088)a  0.6663  (0.2062)a  0.5690  (0.1877)a  0.5791  (0.1880)a 
   
Drug loss       0.5540  (0.1779)a  0.5457  (0.1749)a   0.7019  (0.1580)a  0.6955  (0.1576)a 
 
Drug loss (t+1)      0.4738  (0.2019)b  0.3913  (0.1943)b  0.4995  (0.1684)a  0.4454  (0.1658)a 
 
Drug loss (t+2)      0.0603  (0.2232)        
 
Pipeline count    0.0059  (0.0011)a  0.0055  (0.0016)a  0.0055  (0.0016)a  0.0031  (0.0012)b  0.0032  (0.0012)a  
        
Log market cap     -0.0050  (0.0186) -0.0007  (0.0188)  -0.0004 (0.0012) -0.0002  (0.0012) 
 
Log R&D        0.0653  (0.0424)   0.0518  (0.0429)  0.0508  (0.0349)  0.0507  (0.0351) 
 
  
 
         
 
Constant  -3.5230  (0.1073)a -1.9046  (0.1670)a -2.1213  (0.4090)a -2.0753  (0.4121)a -2.4096  (0.3059)a -2.3076  (0.3028)a 
    
   
   
 
Firm dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes            Yes            Yes             Yes 
Year dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes            Yes            Yes             Yes  
 
N            8,311         4,004         3,196          3,196           3,196           3,196 
Log likelihood       -2542.24      -2222.93     -1506.65      -1504.31       -2038.04        -2035.58 
χ2          684.74        358.87       285.53         294.54         392.20          388.32 
    
 
Table 5(b): Marginal effects for patenting and new FDA approved product introductions 
 
 
       Model 1      Model 2       Model 3      Model 4       Model 5      Model 6  
        ∂y/∂x                ∂y/∂x                  ∂y/∂x                ∂y/∂x               ∂y/∂x                          ∂y/∂x 
 
Lagged patent filings  0.0032    (0.0003)a  0.0083  (0.0008)a  0.0085  (0.0012)a  0.0094  (0.0012)a  0.0077  (0.0013)a  0.0072  (0.0013)a 
 
Total continuations            0.0026  (0.0012)b   
 
Non-US Inventor            0.0035  (0.0020)c 
 
Drug loss (t-1)      0.1541  (0.0766)b  0.1421  (0.0745)c  0.1627  (0.0784)b  0.1710  (0.0798)b 
 
Drug loss       0.1305  (0.0639)b  0.1211  (0.0615)b   0.1278  (0.0629)b  0.1348  (0.0645)b 
 
Drug loss (t+1)      0.1060  (0.0593)b  0.1156  (0.0700)c  0.1000  (0.0562)b  0.0839  (0.0424)b 
 
Pipeline count    0.0009  (0.0021)a  0.0013  (0.0003)a  0.0013  (0.0039)a  0.0014  (0.0003)a  0.0013  (0.0003)a  
        
  
   
   
 
Firm dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes            Yes            Yes             Yes 
Year dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes            Yes            Yes             Yes  
 
N            8,311         4,004         3,196          3,196           3,196           3,196 
    
 
a
 denotes significance at the 1% level; b denotes significance at the 5% level; and c denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 
Table 6(b): Marginal effects for citation-weighted patenting and new FDA approved product introductions 
 
 
 
       Model 1      Model 2       Model 3      Model 4       Model 5      Model 6  
        ∂y/∂x               ∂y/∂x                  ∂y/∂x                ∂y/∂x              ∂y/∂x               ∂y/∂x 
 
 
 
Citation weighted  0.0005    (0.0008)a  0.0014  (0.0001)a  0.0010  (0.0002)a  0.0010  (0.0002)a  0.0009  (0.0017)a  0.0009  (0.0001)a 
    filings 
 
Total continuations      0.0037  (0.0013)a  0.0031  (0.0013)b  0.0033  (0.0011)a  0.0030  (0.0010)a   
 
Non-US Inventor        0.0050  (0.0019)a    0.0037  (0.0012)a 
 
Drug loss (t-1)      0.2290  (0.0958)b  0.2297  (0.0944)b  0.1710  (0.0721)b  0.1734  (0.0723)b 
 
Drug loss       0.1806  (0.0727)b  0.1755  (0.0706)b   0.2220  (0.0670)a  0.2175  (0.0659)a 
 
Drug loss (t+1)      0.1489  (0.0768)c  0.1173  (0.0682)c  0.1436  (0.0595)b  0.1238  (0.0554)b 
 
Pipeline count    0.0011  (0.0021)a  0.0014  (0.0004)a  0.0014  (0.0003)a  0.0007  (0.0003)a  0.0007  (0.0002)a  
        
  
   
   
 
Firm dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes            Yes            Yes             Yes 
Year dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes            Yes            Yes             Yes  
 
N            8,311         4,004         3,196          3,196           3,196           3,196 
    
 
a
 denotes significance at the 1% level; b denotes significance at the 5% level; and c denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
Table 7(a):  Relationship between citations and FDA approved products, 1985 to 2001 
 
Logistic regression estimates for our data regressing an indicator, NDA, on three separate citations measures.  NDA equals one if an underlying 
patent is linked with a FDA approved product.  The population for this analysis includes all patents for sample firms from 1985 to 2001 within 
the same technology classifications as the population of FDA approved products.  Year effects are included in all three models.  Λ is the logistic 
distribution.  See Table 1 for independent variable definitions.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  We test the model: 
 
P(yi,t≠0|xi,t) = Λ(x) = e(x)/[1 + e(x)] 
 
∂Λ/∂xi,t = λ(xβ)βi 
 
 
 
a
 denotes significance at the 1% level; b denotes significance at the 5% level; and c denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
       Model 1    Model 2     Model 3 
    Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
 
 
Total citations I     1.0292       
    (0.0016)a   
 
Total citations II      1.0355 
      (0.0021)a 
 
Total citations III        1.1628 
        (0.0162)a 
 
Year dummies       Yes     Yes     Yes 
N      39,601    39,601    39,601 
Log likelihood   -3997.84 -4001.66 -4079.62 
χ2              550.10    542.48    386.56 
 
 
 
Table 7(b):  FDA approved product sales, 1990 to 2001  
 
 
Year  Number 
of drugs 
 Mean 
(000s) 
 Min 
(000s) 
 Max  
(000s) 
 Total  
(000s) 
 
           
1990  76  $42,139  $6  $702,503  $3,626,126 
1991  95  $59,010  $12  $843,221  $5,605,981 
1992  114  $75,684  $17  $985,047  $8,627,938 
1993  135  $87,117  $2  $982,432  $11,760,843 
1994  154  $101,103  $1  $997,535  $15,569,877 
1995  175  $113,839  $2  $1,293,356  $19,919,868 
1996  215  $122,112  $2  $1,856,558  $26,253,993 
1997  263  $131,823  $1  $2,391,535  $34,669,550 
1998  297  $170,925  $1  $3,580,407  $50,764,694 
1999  326  $196,707  $2  $4,309,658  $64,126,433 
2000  354  $219,397  $1  $4,717,466  $77,666,640 
2001  377  $243,452  $1  $5,106,910  $91,781,516 
 
* All financial variables are in constant 2000 dollars. 
